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ABSTRACT

There are a great number of patent law doctrines that are currently under
reconsideration by the Federal Circuit.
These doctrines include patent claim
construction under the 2006 Phillipscase, the problem of foreign activity being used
as patent-defeating prior art as shown in the recent Eisner case, the growing
challenge of extraterritorial acts as patent infringement as presented in the 2004
expected cases of Blackberryand Eolas, the "Rule 105" implications for patent office
practice in Star Fruits,the change in willful infringement law set forth in the recent
Knorr-Bremse case, the continuing problem of co-inventorship recurring in Xechem,
the search for statutory utility dealt with in the 2005 Fisher case and the ever
present possession requirement for utility. This article presents a brief summary of
the cases involving these eight doctrines and discusses the potential implications of
each on current patent law and practice.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN PATENT LAW 2004'
HAROLD C. WEGNER**

OVERVIEW

A great number of patent law doctrines are under reconsideration by the Federal
Circuit. This paper provides an overview of recent decisions and current cases that
are likely to shape the patent laws for the years to come.
The most important area of controversy in patent law today is the area of patent
claim construction. Currently, the United States has by far the most arcane and
complex set of rules to interpret patent claims of any major country in the world.
This truth is to the great detriment of business certainty and Wall Street confidence
behind investments in technology-dependent industries. Yet, panel predictability
and a "shuffling" of precedent may in the end be all that can be expected in the en
banc decision expected perhaps fifteen months or so from now in the Phillips case,
discussed in Part I.
A major trend in the patent law is the growth of the use of foreign activity as
patent-defeating prior art, which was triggered by the recent Eisner case, discussed
in Part II.
Another hot area of controversy is the challenge of adapting to the global reality
that internet technology may be practiced in part outside the United States but still
impact domestic commerce. Claims, therefore, need to be tailored to provide for
infringement by a party within the United States. Even now, some of the claims
before the courts have been drafted to recite at least one element that pertains to
activity outside the United States. Expected before the end of 2004 is a key case in
this area: the Blackberry case, discussed in Part III.A. A different issue in this area
of controversy involves the Eolas case, in which an American patentee who failed to
obtain foreign patent coverage but sought to bootstrap claims to foreign infringement
through the special export infringement provision of § 271(f). The Eolas case is
discussed in Part III.B.
Perhaps the most important procedural case to be decided in some time relating
to practice before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") is the Star Fruits
case that, if affirmed, will provide a Federal Circuit imprimatur of acceptance of the
controversial "Rule 105"-whereby the USPTO can require "information" from an
assignee unrelated to the persons involved in the procurement of the patent
application and on issues far broader than the scope of "material" information under
the now familiar "duty of disclosure." The Star Fruitscase is discussed in Part IV.
In addition, in its opinion in Knorr-Bremse, the Federal Circuit recently
returned the issue of willfulness awards in patent infringement to the discretion of
' This paper was prepared for and presented to the Cleveland Intellectual Property
Law
Association, October 20, 2004.
- Harold Wegner is the former Director of the Intellectual Property Law Program and
Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School; Foley & Lardner, Washington, D.C.
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the trial courts under a "totality of the circumstances" test. The Knorr-Bremse case
is discussed in Part V.
Co-inventorship continues to be a problem for post-grant attempts by third
parties to add an inventor who has not assigned his patent rights to the original
assignee. By naming the additional co-inventor, the assignee from that co-inventor
then has a free right to practice the invention independent of the rights of the
original patentee(s) or any original "exclusive" licensee(s).
This scenario is
illustrated in the Xechem case, discussed in Part VI.
For emerging technologies, such as nanotechnology, as well as those in the more
mature biotechnology and chemical areas, the potential blockbuster case for 2005
may be Fisher,which involves an attempt by a biotechnology applicant to have the
court find statutory utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 based upon a nebulous statement of
usefulness that is contrary to the controlling precedent of the 1967 split opinion in
the Kirk case. The Fishercase is discussed in Part VII.
Finally, continuing for now to exist-and fester-on the doctrinal "back burner,"
as well as a furthering a sense of aggravation and uncertainty in the chemical
industry, is the special panel-dependent requirement for "possession" of an invention
as a species of the "written description" requirement, discussed in Part VIII.

I. THE LIKELY 2006 PHILLIPS CLAIM CONSTRUCTION CASE
In Philli's v. A WH Corp., the Federal Circuit determined to hear the case en
banc to resolve seven issues related to the construction of patent claims:
(1) Is the public notice function of patent claims better served by
referencing primarily to technical and general purpose dictionaries and
similar sources to interpret a claim term or by looking primarily to the
patentee's use of the term in the specification? If both sources are to be
consulted, in what order?
(2)
If dictionaries should serve as the primary source for claim
interpretation, should the specification limit the full scope of claim language
(as defined by the dictionaries) only when the patentee has acted as his own
lexicographer or when the specification reflects a clear disclaimer of claim
scope?
If so, what language in the specification will satisfy those
conditions? What use should be made of general as opposed to technical
dictionaries? How does the concept of ordinary meaning apply if there are
multiple dictionary definitions of the same term? If the dictionary provides
multiple potentially applicable definitions for a term, is it appropriate to
look to the specification to determine what definition or definitions should
apply?
(3) If the primary source for claim construction should be the specification,
what use should be made of dictionaries? Should the range of the ordinary
meaning of claim language be limited to the scope of the invention disclosed
in the specification, for example, when only a single embodiment is
disclosed and no other indications of breadth are disclosed?
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(4) Instead of viewing the claim construction methodologies in the majority
and dissent of the now-vacated panel decision as alternative, conflicting
approaches, should the two approaches be treated as complementary
methodologies such that there is a dual restriction on claim scope, and a
patentee must satisfy both limiting methodologies in order to establish the
claim coverage it seeks?
(5) When, if ever, should claim language be narrowly construed for the sole
purpose of avoiding invalidity under, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 and 112?
(6) What role should prosecution history and expert testimony by one of
ordinary skill in the art play in determining the meaning of the disputed
claim terms?
(7) Consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), and our en banc decision in Cybor
Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998), is it
appropriate for this court to accord any deference to any aspect of trial court
claim construction rulings? If so, on what aspects, in what circumstances,
1
and to what extent?
Patent managers cannot wait until 2006 for the en banc opinion in Philipsto
retool their overall patent procurement procedures to deal with the results of that
case. The legal standards that are likely to emerge from Phillips are dealt with
elsewhere. 2 Much can alreadybe seen that must be done and shouldbe done "today."

A. A Focus upon Clear andLiterallyInfringed Claims
While Phillipsmay be up to eighteen months away from a decision, what is clear
already is that the trend of the past several years toward a strict construction of
claims against a careless patentee will continue. 3 Thus, even under the mainstream
approach of the Liebel-Flarsheimcase, the best that a patentee can hope for from an
infringement claim construction determination is that his claims will be given their
ordinary meaning if they are clearly drafted. 4 Even under Liebel-Flarsheim, a
clearly worded claim may well be given a diminished scope if there is an unequivocal
argument surrendering a given scope protection. 5 Cases have shown that even if the
terminology is clear, the use of the wrong two-letter preposition-"to" instead of "at,"

1 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed Cir. 2004).
2 See Harold C. Wegner, Claim Construction:The En Bane Phillips Case: Substantive Law of
Claim Construction,ProceduralDeference to the Trial Court, Policy Concerns & Practice Under the
Trend of Recent Case Law, 160, available at http://www.foley.com/files/tbl-s3lPublications/File

UploadI37/2190/claimconstruction.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
3 Philps,376 F.3d at 1382.
Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 906.
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as shown in the ChefAmerica case 6-may lead to a nonsensical interpretation which
makes the claim worthless. A simple spelling mistake of one word-"from" instead of
"for"-led to the same result in Teknowledge.7 With the notable exception of one of
the twelve members of the court who has shown a continuing attitude of liberality as
manifested in Merck v. Teva,8 the majority of the court-including the mainstream
followers of Liebel-Flarsheim-follows the strict and unforgiving approach of Chef
America. If Liebel-Flarsheim and Chef America represent the center of the court,
and Merck v. Teva represents a solitary vote at one end of the bell-shaped curve, the
other end is represented by the panel opinion in Phillips-an even stricterview of
claim interpretation. Whereas the center-viewed members of the court in LiebelFlarsheim generally look to the specification and prosecution history only for the
contextual setting of claim wording, the vacated majority opinion in Phillipslooks to
the specification as a major and primary source for claim construction, even at the
expense of the ordinary meaning of the claim's wording.
The various briefs amici curiae in the Phillips case primarily embrace the
Liebel-Flarsheim middle road, while a minority endorses the stricter view of the
Phillipspanel. However, nobody endorses the holistic and unstructured approach of
Merck v. Teva.
The bottom line for industry is that these harsh limits of claim construction
which have existed for the past few years will either continue in their current form or
be made more severe. There is no trend toward the liberality of earlier days when
the court was far more forgiving of patentee mistakes, omissions, or simply the
tunnel vision or lack of 20-20 hindsight appreciation of the need for broader claims.
6 Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The specification

disclosed a baking process that included a step of heating dough at a temperature of up to 850 F. for
a period of at little as ten seconds to set the batter. Id. at 1372. However, the claim instead stated a
limitation of "heating the . . . dough TO a temperature in the range of about 400 F. to 850 F. for a
period of time ranging from about 10 seconds to 5 minutes" for the purpose of setting the batter. Id.
at 1371 (emphasis added). Obviously, the examples did not disclose creating a dough product at
8500-a temperature so high that a self-cleaning oven is automatically locked to safeguard the
kitchen user. Id. at 1373. Such at temperature would transform any bakery effort into a charcoallike result. Id. Yet, the claim called for heating TO a temperature of 800 degrees, a totally
nonsensical result. Id. (emphasis added).
7 Teknowledge Corp. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., No. C02-05741 SI, 2004 WL 2042864, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 11, 2004). A typographical error created a nonsensical meaning for an internet business
claim where a part of the process concerned objects "fetched for [the] clients." Id. at *4. However,
the claim called for "objects fetched from [the] clients." Id. at *5. Finding this nonsensical claim
construction not infringed-and the claim itself fatally indefinite and thus invalid-the court noted
that "the clear line of Federal Circuit authority dictates that this Court may not re-draft claims to
change their ordinary meaning, even if the ordinary meaning produces a nonsensical result." Id. at
*7. Thus,
even assuming that this was a typographical error, the Court cannot redraft the
claim to render it operable. The purpose of claim language is to "putl competitors
on notice of the scope of the claimed invention", and to "prevent[] unduly
burdening competitors who must determine the scope of the claimed invention
based on an erroneously drafted claim."
Id.
8 Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 347 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (reading a
claim limited to a specific "acid" to reach the chemically absurd result, see id. at 1374-75 (Mayer, J.,
dissenting), that the claimed acid was considered to be a "salt" to save the patentee who failed to
claim the acid and derivativesof the acid).
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Industry in the nineties clamored for greater certainty in claim construction as
the notice function of patents became of paramount importance. The ultimate reach
of the notice function as viewed by the mainstream members of the Federal Circuit
necessarily comes at a price to patentees who do not provide fair notice for their
invention in their patent. This is evident where the patentee discloses but does not
claim the invention. The result is a hardball claim construction regime, which, at its
most extreme, is perhaps best exemplified by ChefAmerica. The patent community
had in essence asked that the court provide the tough rubric of Chef America, and
now the flip side of the question is how to adapt patent drafting and prosecution
techniques to the realities of such an approach.

B. The Need to Claim all DisclosedEmbodiments
It is extremely important when a patent is drafted that the claims be carefully
checked against the essential disclosed embodiments to ensure the claim wording is
broad enough to cover those embodiments. Failure to obtain literal coverage may
translate into failure to obtain any coverage under the Johnson & Johnston
"disclosure-dedication" rule.9 In Johnson & Johnston, the court held that
when a patent drafter discloses but declines to claim subject matter ...

action dedicates that unclaimed
the doctrine of equivalents to
unclaimed would "conflict with
scope of the patentee's exclusive

this

subject matter to the public. Application of
recapture subject matter deliberately left
the primacy of the claims in defining the
right."10

While the patentee in Johnson & Johnston had intentionally refrained from
literally claiming the disclosed equivalent, the court in Toro expressly held "that
intent is not part of the Johnson & Johnston disclosure-dedication analysis."11 In
contrast, the patent drafters of Merck v. Teva made a simple mistake-one which
had occurred not infrequently in previous years but without penalty.1 2 Merck owned
a patent to an acid that could be administered in the form of its salts. 13 The salts
were specifically disclosed in the patent's specification. 14 The patentee should have
claimed the specific "acid and pharmaceutically acceptable salts thereof."15 Instead,
the patentee merely claimed the acid, per se. 16 The salts were clearly equivalent to
the acid; anyone with even a fundamental knowledge of chemistry would understand
Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc).
10Id.
11Toro Co. v. White Consolidated Indus., Inc., 383 F.3d 1326, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The court
also found that '[t]he language of Johnson & Johnston [was] clear" and quoted it with approval:
'The patentee's subjective intent is irrelevant to determining whether unclaimed subject matter has
been disclosed and therefore dedicated to the public."' Id. (quoting Johnson & Johnston,285 F.3d at
1053 n.1).
12 Merck, 347 F.3d at 1370-71.
13Id. at
Jd

14

15

Id.

16Id.

1371.
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that the salts were disclosed equivalents and-until recently-should have been
found to be covered under the doctrine of equivalents. 17 However, under the en bane
ruling in the Johnson & Johnston case, it is better to fail to disclose an unclaimed
equivalent because a disclosed equivalent is now barred from being considered an
18
infringing equivalent.

C. A Frills-FreeFirstPatentApplication

1. Focus on the Claim DraftingExercise
Patent attorneys must focus their patent drafting skills on both the claims and
providing definitions and other support for the claims. Often, patent attorneys who
are "stumped" by trying to figure out the scope of an invention disclosure will idle
their mental gears by describing the prior art known to them and creating "objects"
and other background information that has nothing to do with support for the claims
under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
1.19 This "filler" material is essentially worthless and has
no place in an original provisional (or perhaps other) application. If anything, it can
hurt the patentee if the true state of the art later develops to include closer prior art.
This is especially the case where an "object" is not met by all aspects of the invention,
or a faux statement of criticality is created which could be used by an opponent to
narrow the scope of protection or create an issue of inequitable conduct. The bottom
20
line is none of this patent "garbage"needsto be in an application,even if accurate.

2. Simple Claim Language
Claim language should be extremely simple. The elements of the claim should
be worded as simply as possible. In addition, the default should be for an open
transition such as "comprising."

3. Arcane American Claim Formats
Jepson language should be eschewed wherever possible to avoid any admission
as to the state of the art. Above all, the default should be to never use a "means"
term in a claim.

17Id.
18Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en bane).

1935 U.S.C. § 112, 1 (2000).
To be sure, the applicant must comply with his duty of disclosure under 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.
Yet, the duty does not require the applicant to provide a general (or other) characte-rizationof the
prior art; rather, it requires only that the applicant identify the prior art. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56
(2004).
20
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4 A Limited Number of Claims
It is far better to provide five to ten crisply worded and clearly defined claims
than to have 100 claims that are difficult to piece together and understand.

5. A Simple Summary with Definitions
The "Summary" in the specification should start with a verbatim copy of "claim
1," including other generic descriptions from other claims, modified by adding a verb.
This should be followed by definitions of terms. It is also important before the
application is filed that, after it has had a chance to "sit" for a few days, the claims be
reviewed from the perspective of a third party who may not understand the claim
language. Therefore, when the claim is read from such a perspective, if it is
discovered that there is any ambiguity or terms that require a definition, the
definition section can be used to "fill in the gaps" early on.

6. A voidinga Court-ImposedDictionaryDefinition
It is too early to tell precisely what the Federal Circuit will decide in Philips
regarding the role of dictionaries in the claim construction analysis. Whether
dictionaries may become a "primary" tool, on par with "intrinsic" evidence, or remain
merely a secondary tool to help educate the court in the claim construction inquiry, is
uncertain. Yet, the problem of a court relying on a dictionary is due in large part to
the failure of the patent draftsman to have anticipatedthe need for a definition.
Beyond the obvious suggestion that clear and unambiguous language should be used,
there are some things that can easily be done today to avoid whatever problems may
continue to be present in the wake of Phillips.

a. Definitionsin the PatentSpecification Itself
The writer of a patent application who has worked on the document through
several revisions, without pause, is perhaps the least likely person to observe a defect
in claim wording in terms of either ambiguity or lack of definition. If the draft of the
application can be left to "sit" for several days, then the draftsman can review the
case with a fresh set of eyes. Thus, when terms in a given claim are identified as
ambiguous-if not simply replaced or eliminated with a redrafted claim-such terms
can be defined in the specification. In so doing, the patentee acts as his own
lexicographer and trumps any dictionary or ordinary meaning to the contrary.

b. Nomination of a Dictionaryor Review Article
Often, a patent attorney is working with one particularly useful review article or
a certain edition of a particular scientific dictionary. In this case, the original
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specification may include a citation to that particular work as the arbiter of any
definitional disputes.

7. ContinualReviewof the Claim Language DuringProcurement

a. Review Within Eighteen Months of the FirstFiling
One of the best safeguards against mistakes in draftsmanship is that an
invention is maintained in secrecy for a full eighteen months starting from the time
of the provisional (or other) application filing and ending with the automatic
publication of the patent application. 21 If a mistake in draftsmanship is found which
would prove fatal if the patent were granted and if there is no basis to redraft the
claims based upon the original specification and if there is secrecy throughout this
period, then it is possible to file a new application because the faulty one has not yet
22
been publicly disclosed.
It is extremely important within the first year after filing to have a complete and
careful review of all aspects of the application because at the end of that time there
needs to be a "perfect" patent application to file under the Patent Cooperation Treaty
("PCT") for foreign protection (or otherwise via the national route).23
Changed
definitions or scope in the PCT application should never be the general rule because
a changed definition or scope that is not supported in the original application may
stand naked as of the actual PCT filing date. Rather, the better approach is to
maintain all original definitions and have claims keyed to these original definitions
(which will then enjoy priority) and to then, if necessary, add additional definitions
and claims (that will stand as of the later date). To the extent the original disclosure
is not carried forward into the later case, to only have a changed definition and to
delete definitions from the earlier case as part of the PCT filing nullifies the original
disclosure for purposes of the PCT application.

b. Review as Partof an Integrated,GlobalProcurement
The same person who drafted the original application also should prosecute the
domestic application as well as any foreign counterpart applications. Every office
action-whether from Alexandria or Munich or Tokyo or elsewhere-may provide a
clue as to an ambiguity or a formal problem in the language used. These serve as
immediate triggers to study whether (1) there is a fundamental problem in the
21 Id.

§ 1.211.
is possible to defer the U.S. "new" filing until up to thirty months from the original date
because the statutory bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), which is based upon the inventor's publication,
takes effect only one year after publication. 37 C.F.R. § 1.495. However, if one waits beyond the
publication date, then any chance to use the new patent application for foreign purposes will be
swept aside, as the publication of the application will create an immediate bar in Europe and Japan,
where there is no grace period based upon the publication of the patent application by the
government-in fact, Europe has no grace period whatsoever. Id.
23 Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, art. 8, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 9 I.L.M. 978.
22 It
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underlying document which would require a re-filing of the case (unless a statutory
bar already exists) or (2) claim wording can be modified to overcome the problem.
Only if the same person handles all aspects of the application process-from drafting
to domestic and foreign procurement-will the opportunity to catch these kinds of
mistakes be optimized. To the extent that foreign procurement is segregated to a
different unit, a Pandora's Box of problems is created which, at the very least, can
lead to inconsistent definitions and arguments. Even worse, the segregation of the
drafting process to a unit or person who never sees the application after it has been
returned to corporate headquarters for prosecution can cause these same problems to
24
begin as early as the domestic application.

c. Pre-Grant,Post-Allowance Review of the Patent Claims
At some point downstream in the procurement process-not later than the
review of an application after a Notice of Allowance-at the very least, the
independent patent claims should be carefully reviewed to ensure accurate literal
coverage and clarity of claim draftsmanship. This should be part of an integrated
review to make sure that where an embodiment is disclosed in the specification, it is
also literally claimed. As part of this review, the attorney should play devil's
advocate to find loopholes in the coverage for obvious embodiments that are outside
25
the range of literal coverage.

d. Post-GrantReview (Within Two Years)
Seemingly simple mistakes must be caught early. Minor mistakes in wording
can often be corrected without causing the problem of new matter or "written
description" basis in the specification. However, if such changes are proposed in a
reissue application, more than two years after the grant date, they may be barred
under 35 U.S.C. § 251, which proscribes filing a reissue for a claim broader than that
26
found in the original patent.

24 In the era before

Chef America and Johnson & Johnston, a climate of cheap patent

procurement developed in some arts. The entire patent drafting process would be shipped out to the
Sun Belt to retired patent attorneys on a case by case basis or to firms with large pools of patent
agents or draftsmen who never had face-to-face contact with the inventors. Once drafted, a different
pool of generally in-house patent lawyers would pick up a case for the first time to consider the
merits-after an Examiner's first action. This meant that an entirely different set of eyes which
were out of tune with both the inventor and the drafter of the patent application evaluated and
defended the merits of the application.
25 This does not mean that the case must be refiled and the current case abandoned. To the
contrary, the norm today is to file a "Vogel trailer." See Symposium, The End of Equivalents?
Examining the Falloutfrom Festo, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 727, 742 (2003)
(discussing the "Vogel Trailer" and implications of In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).
Before the grant of the patent, a continuation application is filed to cover miscellaneous
embodiments that could not be fit within the claims as allowed by the examiner. Id. A terminal
disclaimer is required for such a case with overlapping claim coverage. Id.
26 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
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II.

ELSNER: FOREIGN ACTIVITY AS "PRIOR ART"

In Esner, a Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences panel further eroded the
definition of "prior art" insofar as previously there had been an exclusion of foreign
uses or sales as patent-defeating prior art. 27 Once Japan switched camps to move in
the direction of the French absolute novelty standard, 28 the historic proscription on
foreign use or sale as "prior art" under American patent law became a unique
peculiarity in the global patent scene. 29 In 1978, the absolute novelty standard
became the common denominator for Europe with the implementation of the Munich
Patent Convention, which serves as the cornerstone treaty for the European patent
system.3 0 There has been much discussion as to whether the United States should
unilaterally adopt this system or whether it should hold out for a balanced treaty
with other countries-using its now unique position on prior art as a "bargaining
31
chip."
Regardless, without any citation of authority whatsoever from any of the public
policy debates in support of such a radical change-or citation of any scholarly or
other writing-an en banc panel of the Federal Circuit in Eisner has judicially
legislated a repeal of the territoriality limitation.3 2 The court dismissed the
retroactivity aspect of its judicial legislation, with the advice-too late for patentees
and applicants who have already filed or who are outside the new time bar-that
"avoidance of a bar [merely requires] a timely filing at the PTO."3 3 Beyond the
damage of retroactivity and the necessary destabilization and cries of panel
uncertainty and unpredictability that are created by judicial legislation of this
nature, one clear point that remains is when Congress does decide to make a
statutory change to codify the ruling in Elsner,it will be clear whatever "bargaining
chip" value there had been in the limitation of territoriality, the judiciary has
34
unilaterally swept the rug out from under our negotiator's feet.

A. One of the Last 'BargainingChips"
Use or sale of an invention in Europe or Japan or, for that matter, anywhere
outside the United States, is not-under most aspects of the patent statute-patent-

27

In re Elsner, 381 F.3d 1125, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane) (finding claims anticipated in

view of foreign sales).
28 See, e.g., James E. Ruland, Identifying the Unglittering Gold: Recognizing Minor
Improvements & Obtaining Valuable Patents, 15 No. 4 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 4, 8 n.32 (2003) (stating
that France and Japan have "world-wide absolute novelty with a limited number of exceptions").
21)See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
'30European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 54(2), 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (also known as the
Munich Patent Convention), available at http://www3.european-patentoffice.org/dwld/epc/epc 2002
_vl.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2004). "The state of art shall be held to comprise everything made
available to the public by means of a written or oral description, by use, orin any other way, before
the date of filing of the European Patent application." Id. (emphasis added).
'31See infra Part II.A.
32 See infra Part II.B.
33In re Elsner, 381 F.3d 1125, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc); see infra Part I.C.
34

See infra Part II.D.
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defeating against an original innovator. 35 This is due to the territorial limitations of
United States patent law that bar the grant of a patent if the same invention has
been "in public use or on sale in this country." 36 Should the United States
internationalize its patent laws to conform to the goals of the scholar critics and
international patent community which do not have such a geographic limitation?
Should the United States do so unilaterally in the interest of the American
innovative community? Should the United States hold out for a harmonization
treaty using our disparity with international practice as a "bargaining chip" to gain
concessions from European and Asian negotiating partners in international fora?
Scholars, including Professors Takenaka 37 and Bagley, 38 have been highly
critical of the geographic limitations on prior art. Professor Takenaka presents a
comparative trilateral view of the geographic restrictions within American law in the
context of patent harmonization and the need for the United States to eliminate the
existing geographic restrictions under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 39 She points out that "[a]n
adoption of [the Substantive Patent Law Treaty] will require the United States to
40
remove the geographical restrictions that presently limit the definition of prior art."
She also suggests the more sweeping mandate that even unwritten foreign activities
be considered prior art. 41 Perhaps more importantly, however, Internet-keyed
information is clearly "prior art" under the treaty, 42 a point which was domestically
43
addressed in Japan five years ago with a revision of its domestic patent law.
Professor Moy states that "particularly modern [authorities] assert the major
'35 There has been some erosion of this principle in the context of limited reliance upon foreign
activity under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2000).
36 Title 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) bars a patent to an "invention ...patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one
year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
Additionally, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), an invention is unpatentable if "the invention was known or
used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent."
37 Toshiko Takenaka, The Best PatentPractieeor Mere Compromise?A Review of the Current
Draft of the Substantive Patent Law Treaty and a Proposalfor a "First-to-Invent"Exception for
Domestic Applicants, 11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 259, 305-06 (2003).
'38Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional:The GeographicalLimitation on PriorArt in a
Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679, 680 (2003).
39 Takenaka, supra note 37, at 305 (discussing the Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty,
art. (1), Sept. 24, 2001, World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on the Law
of Patents, 7th Sess.).
10 Id. Professor Takenaka notes that "Article 8(1) [defines the] prior art as 'all information,
which has been made available to the public anywhere in the world in any form."' Id. at 276-77
(quoting Draft Substantive PatentLaw Treaty, art. 8(1), Sept. 24, 2001, World Intellectual Property
Organization, Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, 7th Sess.). "SPLT Regulation Rule 8
explains any form that includes oral communication, display, and use of the invention." Id. at 305
n.372 (citation omitted).
41 Id. at 305. "The current U.S. system discriminates between written and unwritten
information and removes from the prior art unwritten information that is available only in foreign
countries. This distinction introduces unnecessary complexity in examination at the USPTO." Id.
(footnote omitted).

42 Id.

43 Id. at 305 n.374 ("Japanese patent law was revised to remove geographical restriction on
non-documentary prior art in Article 29, § 1, and made foreign public use and knowledge as the
prior art for rejecting an application regarding both novelty and inventive step.").
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justification [for the geographic limitation on prior art] to be largely
administrative. ' 44 Professor Moy counts as one of several writers who have criticized
the American policy, including Professors Bagley, 45 Kadidal 46 and Bliss, 47 as well as
Donald Chisum, who was an advocate for elimination of the geographical limitation
48
more than a full generation ago.

B. JudicialLegislationfrom Madison Place
In an act of judicial legislation, an en banc panel of the Federal Circuit in Elsner
has swept the negotiating chips off the table and unilaterally and retroactively
started the United States down the slippery slope toward elimination of the
geographic limitation on public uses and sales. 49 The technical issue before the court
in Elsner was whether an otherwise non-enabling prior art publication is an
anticipation. 50 This, of course, is obviously not the case. 51 However, in addition to
the publication itself, there was a foreign sale of the claimed subject matter. 52 There
was, however, no nexus between the non-enabling prior art publication and the
foreign activity.5 3 Nevertheless, the court held that since there was a foreign use or
sale, this meant one skilled in the art could practice the invention and, as such, the
54
otherwise non-enabling prior art was enabled by that foreign sales activity.
The court, at first, acknowledged that "[o]rdinarily, foreign sales of an invention
in combination with a publication will not constitute a bar because such a result
44 R. CARL MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 8:192 n.1 (4th ed. 2004) (citing William
LaMarca, Reevaluating the GeographicalLimitation of 35 US.C. § 102(b)." The Policies Considered,
22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 25 (1996)) [hereinafter WALKER ON PATENTS]; see also PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, "To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF THE ...USEFUL ARTS" IN AN
AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY 5 (1966).
4'WALKER ON PATENTS, supra note 44, § 8.192 n.1.
46 Id.
47 Daniel H. Bliss, Bridge Over Troubled Water: Extending the Pubhlie Use Bar to Foreirn
Countries, 1987 DETROIT C.L. REV. 65 (1987).
48 Donald S. Chisum, ForeignActivity.*Its Effect on PatentabilityUnder United States Law,11
I.I.C. 26, 26 (1980).
49See generallyIn re Elsner, 381 F.3d 1125, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
5ld.at 1127-28.
51 In Elsner and a companion Zary case, the facts involved publication of plant breeders' rights

certificates that qualified as 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) prior art, but which clearly did not enable practice of
the invention under In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929 (C.C.P.A. 1962). Thus,
appellants ... assert that, because foreign sales are not prior art under the patent
statute, they may not be considered within the knowledge of one of skill in the art
and cannot be used to enable an otherwise non-enabled publication. They claim
that the published [prior art] applications are not enabled because it is impossible
to recreate the claimed plants from the textual descriptions alone, and they assert
that the published applications are therefore not effective as § 102(b) references.
Elsner, 381 F.3d at 1128. The court stated that "[t]he particular question thus before us is whether
evidence of the foreign sale of a claimed reproducible plant variety may enable an otherwise nonenabled printed publication disclosing that plant, thereby creating a § 102(b) bar. On that issue of
first impression, we hold in the affirmative." Id.
52 Id. at 1127.
5 Id.at 1131.
54 Id.
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would circumvent the established rules that neither non-enabling publications nor
foreign sales can bar one's right to a patent."55 Indeed, that has been the law.
Notwithstanding, the court reasoned that "[w]hat sets this case apart is that it deals
with plant patents[.]" 56 Distinguishing the body of law that otherwise clearly bars
use of foreign activity as a statutory bar, the court affirmed the foreign activity to
create a statutory bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), noting that "[biecause we perceive a
difference between plants and statutorily distinct inventions, we disagree with
Appellants' contention that this holding will operate to create a printed publication
57
bar whenever a non-enabling publication and a foreign sale are involved."
The court cited no Federal Circuit precedent for its distinction of "plants" versus
other patents in connection with the scope of prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).58 As
such, the court implicitly recognized that the distinction it had drawn was one
without meaning.
At oral argument, Judge Clevenger posed the hypothetical question of whether
an announcement in a "Finnish" paper about a new "Nokia" product which was not
enabling could be converted into a statutory bar against a later filing to that product
if the "Nokia" product were available in Finland. 59 Indeed, one can well imagine that
there could be countless trade papers, e-mails to the industry, website postings and
the like that could technically be considered a "printed publication" similar to the
prior art in the Elsner case and yet be equally non-enabling. The author of Elsner
would distinguish Judge Clevenger's hypothetical case on the basis that Elsner
claimed a plant. 60 However, there is nothing in 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) on which to draw
such a distinction. 61 Elsner is simply the latest in a series of cases where a Federal
62
Circuit panel has judicially expanded the scope of prior art.

C. "You Should Have FiledEarlier"
In terms of the retroactivity of the law, the Elsner court was not concerned that
its decision would adversely impact pre-existing patent applicants, stating that: "in
any event, the inventor is in control of the activities relating to his invention, and
63
avoidance of a bar is accomplished by making a timely filing at the PTO."
55 d
56 Id. at 1128.

57 Id. at 1129.
58 See id. at 1128-31.
59 Transcript of Oral Arguments Before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, In re Elsner, 381 F.3d 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Nos. 03-1569, 03-1585).
60 See Elsner 381 F.3d at 1128.
61 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
62 See, e.g., In re Kathawala, 9 F.3d 942 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (transforming the forfeiture provision
for novelty only for what is claimed into a prior art basis for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
including the unclaimed teachings of the patent); OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d
1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (transforming the bar based upon derivation into prior art for obviousness
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)); ef WALKER ON PATENTS, supra note 44, § 8:278 ("The issue under [35
U.S.C. §] 102(d) is whether patenting would result in domestic industry being unfairly constrained
in relation to the industry of the foreign country. This requires reference, not to the foreign patent's
ability to teach the art, but to its preclusive effect.").
6 Elsner, 381 F.3d at 1129.
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Certainly, this is good prospective advice. However, to the patent applicant with a
case already on file who relied upon the law at the time he filed his case, there is
little solace.

D. The March to End PriorArt "Territoriality"
The "bargaining chip" value vel non--in terms of gaining reforms of European
and Asian laws as a price for the internationalization of American law-of the unique
American viewpoint has now been largely spent. Surely, Congress will eventually
codify the change in the patent laws which have taken place in Eisner. Whether it
was wise for the Federal Circuit to have judicially jumped the legislative gun isnow
be a subject for the scholars to debate.

III. EXTRATERRITORIAL ACTS AS PATENT INFRINGEMENT
Two very high-profile Internet infringement cases are in the pipeline for
ultimate resolution at the Federal Circuit. 64 Expected at any time is a decision by
the court in the NT, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd. patent litigation-popularly
known as the "Blackberry' case. 65 Not yet docketed at the Federal Circuit is an
appeal in the case of Eolas Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,66 where the trial
court awarded $521 million in damages. 67 Each case involves the issue of patent
68
extraterritoriality.

A. Blackberry:A Claimed Combination with an Offshore Element
Internet patent claims often include a combination of elements. In addition,
crucial acts often take place outside the United States. The Blackberry patent
litigation involves a claim to an Internet-based combination (system). 69 One of the
issues is whether such a claim is infringed if one of the elements of that combination

64 See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 2d 423 (E.D. Va. 2002); Eolas Techs.,
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
65 NTP, 261 F. Supp. 2d 423. The appeal was argued on June 7, 2004. The defendant in NTP,
Research in Motion, Ltd., or "RIM," is the manufacturer of the Blackberry Pager, one of the accused
devices in the case. Id. at 426.
66 Eolas, 274 F. Supp. 2d 972.
67Paul Festa, The Eolas-Mirosoftcase-patent ending?, CNET NEWS.COM, Mar. 16, 2004, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1032_3-5173287.html.
68 See NTP, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 429 (finding that to be liable for infringement "it is only
necessary that [the defendant] provide some of the components of [the] patented invention in the
United States, even if such component [sic] will be combined outside of the United States"); Eolas,
274 F. Supp. 2d at 973-74 (permitting plaintiffs to seek damages for infringing products made
outside of the United States).
69See NTP, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 425-26.
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is practiced offshore (in Canada).70 A key ground for noninfringement in the case
71
relates to the offshore practice of at least one element of the combination.
In Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., the Federal Circuit put another nail in the
extraterritoriality coffin against patentees who either failed to properly claim their
inventions to provide for a domestic act of infringement or simply failed to obtain
72
foreign patent protection to cover foreign infringement.

B. Eolas.§ 271(f) Offshore Assembly of a PatentedCombination
In Eolas, the question which resulted in a substantial portion of the $500 million
plus damages awarded at the trial court level was whether the export from the
United States of a "golden master" disk containing software to be recreated and
assembled offshore which then was used to create a patented combination was an act
of patent infringement. 73 In both Eolas and Pellegrin4 a claimed combination was
assembled offshore with the use of a component that was also made offshore.7 4 The
difference between the two cases is that whereas the component in Pellegriniwas
physically made offshore as a "thing,"75 the component at issue in Eolas was
software, which was made or recreated offshore by using a "golden master" that was
76
shipped to the offshore site from the United States.

C. The Pellegrini Case

1. Pellegrini Extraterritoriality
Pellegrini was decided by a panel that included Circuit Judges Rader and
Bryson.77
The court found that the question in this case was whether the
components which were made outside of the United States and never actually
physically shipped to or received from the United States can nevertheless still be
considered infringing.7 8 The question centered on whether it would still be within
the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) if those components were originally designed in
the United States and the instructions for using those components to assemble the
actual invention were transmitted from the United States to the offshore assembly
79
location.
The court noted that the statute finds infringement where someone "supplies or
causes to be supplied" from within the United States all or even a substantial portion
70

Id. at 435.

71 See id.
72 Pellegrini

v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

73 Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
74

Eolas, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 973-74; Pellegrin4,375 F.3d at 1115-17.

75 Pelegrini,375 F.3d at 1115 (integrated circuit chips).
76 Eolas, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 973-74.
77 Pollogrini,375 F.3d at 1113.
7 Id. at 1115.
79 Id.
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of the components necessary to create the patented invention.80 In addition, the
supplier must actively encourage the combination the components in a way that
would cause infringement of the patent if the same combination were to be made
81
within the United States.
Thus, the court found that it is necessary that the actual "components" be
physically present and exported from the United States to meet the requirements of
the statute. 82 The court acknowledged that the history of § 271(f) showed that it was
created only after the Supreme Court's decision in I)eepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp.83 The Deepsouth opinion had found a loophole in the patent laws wherein the
unauthorized manufacture of patented devices would not be infringement where the
creation of the unassembled components occurred within the United States and the
84
components were subsequently shipped out of the United States for assembly.
Citing Rotec Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp.,85 the court noted that
"Congress enacted § 271(f) in order to close that loophole." 86 The legislative history
indicated that the bill was designed "'to avoid encouraging manufacturers outside the
United States' and to 'prevent copiers from avoiding U.S. patents by supplying
components of a patented product in this country so that the assembly of the
87
components may be completed abroad."'
88
However, no component in Pellegriniwas actually made in the United States.
Although the direction to make the components abroad (in Ireland and Taiwan)
originated from the United States, the accused infringer defended simply on the basis
that the actual components themselves were not made in the United States and
therefore did not satisfy the "supplies" requirement of § 271(f)(1).89

80Id. at 1116.
81 35 U.S.C. §

271(f)(1) (2000).
F.3d at 1117.

82 Pe]egrini,375
83

Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).

84 Pe]]egrini,375 F.3d at 1116.
85 Rotec

Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1250 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
86 Pe]]egrini,375 F.3d at 1116.
87 Id. (quoting 130 CONG. REC. 10,525 (1984)).
88 Td. at 1115.
89 Id.at 1118. The patentee alleged that the accused infringer
is incorporated in the United States and has executive, marketing, and product
line responsibilities for ADMC products; that [it] conceived and designed the
ADMC products; that [it] is the exclusive manufacturer of ADMC products; that
[it] makes all development and production decisions for ADMC products; that [it]
is responsible for the fabrication, assembly, and testing of ADMC products; that
ADMC uses, subcontracts with, and pays others for the express purpose of the
proprietary fabrication, assembly, and testing of ADMC products; that [it]'s
ADMC products are capable of motor control; that [it] sets budgetary pricing and
receives payment for ADMC products sold worldwide; and that [it] receives
purchase orders from and invoices customers worldwide for ADMC products and
increases production levels for ADMC products in response to those purchase
orders.
Id.at 1116.
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2. The Pellegrini Affirmance ofNon -Infringement
Affirming summary judgment of noninfringement, the court noted that this
issue was explained by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Duehesne,90 where the Court
found that the patent laws "'do not, and were not intended to, operate beyond the
limits of the United States."' 91 The court criticized the patentee for having failed to
seek foreign patent protection. 92 Indeed, the accused infringer set forth that the
patentee had made a conscious decision to not obtain any foreign patent protection on
93
the invention and, as such, should be bound by that choice.
The court denied the patentee's appeal on the basis that § 271 is clear on its
face, stating:

[§ 271] applies only where components of a patent invention are physically
present in the United States and then either sold or exported "in such a
manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside
the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such
94
combination occurred within the United States."
The court then noted that the actual patent infringement is committed not where the
injury is felt, but instead where the offending act actually occurs.9 5 The court
emphasized that the actual language of § 271(f)(1) is primarily focused upon the
location of the components, not the location of the infringer. 96 The patentee argued
that all the business activities and directions for assembly came from the United
States. 97 Denying the merits of this argument, the court stated that
the language of [35 U.S.C.] § 271(f) clearly contemplates that there must be
an intervening sale or exportation; there can be no liability under § 271(f)(1)
unless components are shipped from the United States for assembly....
...[A]lthough [the accused infringer] may be giving instructions from
the United States that cause the components of the patented invention to be
supplied, it is undisputed that those components are not being supplied in
98
or from the United States.
In addition, the court noted that it was probable that the sales and offers for sales
may well have been made in the United States, but nonethless
there is no evidence of record that any of that manufacturing occurs in the
United States or that Analog offers to sell those products in the United
90 Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1857).
91 Pellegrinz 375 F.3d at 1117 (quoting Brown,60 U.S. at 195).
92 See

id.

Id.
91 Id. (citations omitted).
95

Id.

9 Id.

97Id.at 1118.
98 Id.at 1117-18.

[4:1 2004]

John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

States. As the Supreme Court explained in Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn.
Moline Plow Co., "the right conferred by a patent under our law is confined
to the United States and its territories, and infringement of this right
cannot be predicated on acts wholly done in a foreign country." 99

D. An IncreasedFocus on Patents that PinpointAmerican Activity
Perhaps the most comprehensive consideration of extraterritorial issues in the
context of computer software and internet infringement took place three years ago in
Tokyo, at the 2001 SOFTIC conference. 100 As considered at that conference, great
care was cautioned to ensure that claims which could be infringed under American
law were provided in the patent-or to provide claims that could be locally enforced
in foreign territories. 10 1 In addition, in the case of offshore assembly, claims that are
infringed under foreign law are important. In terms of invention residing in a
combination of elements where one element, such as a server, could be offshore, one
is cautioned against failing to claim an element that is practiced in the United
States. 10 2 This represents a potentially fatal problem for the combination claims in
the Blackberrycase.

E. Focus on Specific, DomesticallyInfringed Claims
As pointed out by Judge Linn in International Rectifier Corp. v. Samsung
Electronics Co., "it is well known that United States patent laws 'do not, and were
not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the United States."' 10 3 Whatever
arguments patentees may have had before, their cases have grown weaker in the
wake of both the Pellegrinicase, 10 4 as well as one of the recent cases the court cites in
Pellegrini the case of InternationalRectifier.10 5 As such, the opinions of the Federal
Circuit in both Blackberryand Eolas are highly anticipated.

9 Id. at 1118 (citation omitted) (quoting Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S.
641, 650 (1915)).
100See Harold C. Wegner, E-Business Patent Infringement: Quest for a Single Station Direct
Infrnngement Claim Model, SOFTIC SYMPOSIUM 2001 (Software Information Center, Tokyo, Japan),
Nov. 20-21, 2001, at http://www.softic.or.jp/symposium/open-materials/lOth/er/wegner-en.pdf. The
conference was attended by judges, practitioners and scholars from several countries, including the
United States.
101Wegner, supranote 100.
102

Id.

10:3Int'l

Rectifier Corp. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 361 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting
Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195 (1857)).
104 Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
105 Int'l Rectifier, 361 F.3d at 1361 (holding that the defendant did not violate the terms of an
injunction by selling allegedly infringing products outside of the United States).
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IV.

STAR FRUITs. THE RULE 105 "INFORMATION"

Under regulations that are just now being tested in the courts, patent examiners
have been given the powerful tool of "Rule 105," a mechanism that permits the
examiner to ask an extremely wide range of questions to obtain "information" for the
patent examination process. 10 6 The scope of Rule 105 goes far beyond the "duty of
disclosure" under Rule 56,107 extending to "any assignee" and covering information
108
beyond materiality.

A. The Star Fruits Test Case
The case of Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States that is now awaiting a decision
from the Federal Circuit10 9 is the first test case that may very well confirm the
authority of the USPTO to issue "information" requirements under Rule 105.
In Star Fruits,just as in the Eisner case, 110 the patent applicant sought plant
patent protection for an invention that had been the subject of a printed
publication-a foreign plant certificate-published more than one year before the
application was filed in the United States.1 11 Because the plant certificate was
clearly not enabling-as in Esnera12-the examiner made an "information" inquiry
under Rule 105.113 Unlike Eisner, where the patent applicant complied with the
request and challenged the rejection on the merits (albeit unsuccessfully),114 in Star
Fruits,the applicant refused to comply with the "information" requirement.1 1 5 From
a holding of abandonment that was sustained by the Alexandria Division of the
Eastern District of Virginia, 116 the Star Fruits case was recently argued before the
117
Federal Circuit and is now awaiting decision.

B. Foreign Use and Sale 'Information"Requirements
The implications of StarFruitsin the first instance will focus upon requirements
for information concerning foreign uses or sales by the inventor (or others) in
106 37 C.F.R. § 1.105(a)(1) (2004) ("[T]he examiner ... may require the submission [from the
inventor or attorney], or any assignee[] of such information as may be reasonably necessary to
properly examine [the application].").
107
Id. § 1.56.
108 See id.§ 1.105.
109 On September 9, 2004, the Federal Circuit (Newman, Clevenger & Dyk, JJ.), heard the oral
argument in Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 2d 512 (E.D. Va. 2003), appeal
docketed, No. 04-1160 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 14, 2004).
110 Star Fruits, see 280 F. Supp. 2d at 513-14, started out on a factually similar basis as In re

Elsner, see 381 F.3d 1125, 1126-27 (Fed.Cir. 2004).
11 StarFruits,280 F. Supp. 2d at 514-15 & n.8.
Elsner, 381 F.3d at 1129.

112

"'3

StarFruits,280 F.Supp. 2d at 513-14.

111See Elsner, 381 F.3d at 1126.
115 StarFruits,280 F. Supp. 2d at 514.
116Id. at 517.
117 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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connection with non-enabling publications-the factual setting of both Star Fruits,as
118
well as the substantively far more important Elsnercase.
It may now be expected that skimpy "printed publications" relating to foreign
use or sale of an invention will now be reasons for major concern. At the oral
arguments in Elsner and the companion Zary case, 119 Judge Clevenger posed the
question whether an affirmance in these cases would result in early foreign
newspaper advertisements of new products ("printed publications") creating a
120
statutory bar problem for applicants if there were an enabling foreign use or sale.
One can also imagine a brief, cursory explanation of a product on a website where
that website posting is not enabling yet still a "printed publication." Is the existence
of a foreign use or sale, contemporaneous with such a website posting, a patentdefeating event under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)?

C. A FarBroader Sweep than the Duty offDiselosure

1. Information from "theAssignee"
The Rule 105 sweep includes "the assignee," which is far broader than the duty
of disclosure under Rule 56.121 Thus, under Rule 105,
[iun the course of examining or treating a matter in a pending or abandoned
application filed under 35 U.S.C. § 111 or 371 (including a reissue
application), in a patent, or in a reexamination proceeding, the examiner or
other Office employee may require the submission, from individuals, or any
assignee, of such information as may be reasonably necessary to properly
examine or treat the matter .... 122
The broader sweep of Rule 105 versus the narrower scope of Rule 56 is justified
on the basis that the information required may be known to the assignee even if not
known by the inventor. 23 One can imagine a multinational conglomerate with
several hundred patent professionals scattered over venues in several continents who
collectively prepare and file several thousand patent applications per year. Also,
imagine further unrelated research units in this multinational conglomerate who
have absolutely nothing to do with the patenting process or any knowledge of patent
law. Yet, the effect of "the assignee" sweep would be to literally cover both the
aforementioned groups of people and require an inquiry of perhaps thousands of

118 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
11) Zary and Elsnerwere argued sequentially, before the same panel, and consolidated into the

single opinion now known as In re Elsner. See Esner, 381 F.3d at 1126.
120 Transcript of Oral Arguments Before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, In ro Elsner, 381 F.3d 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane) (Nos. 03-1569, 03-1585).
121 37 C.F.R. § 1.105(a)(1) (2004); see id. § 1.56.
122

Id. § 1.105(a)(1).

123

MPEP].

MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE

§ 704.10 (8th ed., rev. 2, 2004) [hereinafter
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persons who have no knowledge of the application and are outside the sweep of the
Rule 56 duty of disclosure.
In contrast, there is no duty of disclosure under Rule 56 that runs to "the
assignee" apart from those with knowledge of the application. 124 Thus, the Rule 56
duty of disclosure is limited to those persons with actual involvement or knowledge of
the procurement process including the inventor, 125 the legal representatives who
"prepare[] or prosecute[] the application", 126 and all others "substantively involved"
with the procurement. 127 Further, the examiner is also given the authority to
demand that the patent attorney identify the field of search, or, according to the rule
128
itself, "what was searched."

2. Information Beyond Rule 56(a) "Materialfity"
The scope of Rule 105 is far broader than the Rule 56 requirement for
information about foreign uses and sales, or information "material" to
patentability.129 The "information" obtainable under Rule 105 represents a true
Pandora's Box for the average patent practitioner, as the "information" is extremely
wide-ranging and far afield from the traditional duty of disclosure imposed by Rule
56 to provide the most relevant prior art or related information. In fact, Rule 105
delves into the thought process of the patent attorney in his drafting of the patent
application. For example, if the applicant has been faced with a patent infringement
question and the problem of designing around a third party's patent, the examiner
has the right under Rule 105 to inquire about this thought process and the identity of
the third party's patent 130-despite the fact that it may be clearly irrelevant to the
patent examination process. 131 Where it is known that a prior art patent is material
to patentability, the patent attorney should cite that patent.1 32 However, to have a
rule that permits a sweep into the thought process of a patent attorney to retrieve
information that is not material is a step beyond what is relevant to the examination
process.
121
125

126
127

See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.
Id. § 1.56(c)(1).
Id. § 1.56(c)(2).
Id. § 1.56(c)(3).

"Every other person who is substantively involved in the preparation or

prosecution of the application and who is associated with the inventor, with the assignee or with
anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign the application." Id.
128 Id.
§ 1.105(a)(1)(ii).
129 Section 1.56(a) provides "a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which
includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to
patentability." Id. § 1.56(a).
130 Id
§ 1.105(a)(1)(v). "Information used in invention process: A copy of any non-patent
literature, published application, or patent (U.S. or foreign) that was used in the invention process,
such as by designing around or providing a solution to accomplish an invention result." Id.
131 It is often the case that there will be a broad generic formula in a chemical case that may
raise an infringement question but is so broad that it raises neither a question of anticipation nor
obviousness of a species thereunder. See In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380, 382 (Fed. Cir. 1994). "The fact
that a claimed compound may be encompassed by a disclosed generic formula does not by itself
render that compound obvious." Id.
132 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.
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If the Examiner is new to the field and does not know how to search the prior art
on electronic databases, instead of making fan inquiry of a senior examiner or other
library resources within the USPTO, he may instead under Rule 105 choose to
question the patent attorney as to how he had the application searched. The
examiner is even allowed to ask what literature or other documents of the inventor
exist and also what documents were used in the drafting of the application. 133 All
such documents may be required to be produced.

V. KNORR-BREMSE: WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT

Willful infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 284 has survived the en bane
clarification in Knorr-Bremse v. Dana Corp., which returned the inquiry to a heavily
factually based totality of the circumstances test entrusted to the sound discretion of
the trial judge. 13 4
While many in the patent community thought that the
Underwater Devices affirmative duty to avoid infringement of a patent would be
thrown out, the court voted 10-1 to maintain the standard that "'where, as here, a
potential infringer has actual notice of another's patent rights, he has an affirmative
duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing."'' 135 All other
aspects of the case were without dissent of any kind.136
It may now be expected that there will be relatively few holdings of willful
infringement at the trial level, and that the court will generally honor the
determination of a trial judge who refrains from reaching a holding of willfulness in
this highly fact-dependent inquiry.

A. A "Totalityof the Circumstanees"Test for Willfulness
In essence, the Knorr-Bremse court turned the clock back a generation to the
pre-Markey era of the regional circuits where willfulness was judged by a "totality of
37
the circumstances" test. Sitting en banc, the court has now cited to Read v. Portee
and stated that "Id]etermination of willfulness is made on consideration of the
1 38
totality of the circumstances and may include contributions of several factors."
1 39
This portion of the opinion was made by a unanimous court.

133

Id. § 1.105(a)(1)(iii) ("Related information: A copy of any non-patent literature, published

application, or patent (U.S. or foreign), by any of the inventors, that relates to the claimed
invention."); id. § 1.105(a)(1)(iv) ("Information used to draft application: A copy of any non-patent
literature, published application, or patent (U.S. or foreign) that was used to draft the application.").
13 Knorr-Bremse v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
135 Id. at 1343 (quoting Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380,
1389 (Fed.Cir. 1983)). Circuit Judge Dyk dissented on this issue. Id. at 1348 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
136 See id. at 1348-52 (Dyk, J., dissenting). Circuit Judge Dyk's dissent on the affirmative duty
issue was the only dissenting opinion in the case. See id.
137 Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826-27 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
138 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342 (citation omitted).
19 The twelfth member of the court, who did not sit for this case, was Circuit Judge Michel. Id.
at 1340.
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There are nine Read v. Portee factors which will now be at the center of
attention for any willfulness inquiry:
(1) [Wihether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of
another;
(2) [Wihether the infringer, when he knew of the other's patent
protection, investigated the scope of the patent and formed a good-faith
belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed; and
(3) [Tihe infringer's behavior as a party to the litigation . . . . In
addition, other circumstances which courts appropriately have considered,
particularly in deciding on the extent of enhancement, are:
(4) [The d]efendant's size and financial condition.
(5) [The c]loseness of the case.
(6) [The d]uration of defendant's misconduct.
(7) [Whether any r]emedial action [was taken] by the defendant.
(8) [The d]efendant's motivation for harm.
140
(9) [Wihether [the] defendant attempted to conceal its misconduct.

B. No Adverse Inference
The Knorr-Bremqe court unanimously overruled earlier precedent to the extent
that it held there to be an adverse inference where an opinion of counsel concerning
infringement is not produced at trial. 141 Instead, the court "h[elld that no adverse
inference that an opinion of counsel was or would have been unfavorable flows from
the alleged infringer's failure to obtain or produce an exculpatory opinion of
142
counsel."
The court thus unanimously said "no" to the first question it had set forth in its
briefing order: "When the attorney-client privilege and/or work-product privilege is
invoked by a defendant in an infringement suit, is it appropriate for the trier of fact
to draw an adverse inference with respect to willful infringement?"' 143 In striking
down the adverse inference, the court also unanimously answered "no" to the second
question: "When the defendant had not obtained legal advice, is it appropriate to
' 144
draw an adverse inference with respect to willful infringement?"

140

Read, 970 F.2d at 827 (citations omitted). The "closeness of the case" issue in factor five is

related to Question (4) of the en banc briefing order concerning whether there is a substantial
defense presented to the infringement charge. Knorr-Btremse, 383 F.3d at 1347. This is considered
in more detail in Part IV.C.2., infra.
MIKnorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1347.
142
113

144

Id. at 1341.
Id. at 1344.
Id. at 1345.
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C. SubstantialDefense as a Basis to Avoid Willfulness

1. SubstantialDefense is not a per se Basis to A void Willfulness
The court found that a substantial defense to an infringement charge should be
considered by the court only as one factor in analyzing willfulness. 145 Thus, the court
answered "no" to the per se rule which was raised as the fourth question in the
briefing order: "Should the existence of a substantial defense to infringement be
sufficient to defeat liability for willful infringement even if no legal advice has been
146
secured?"

2. Considerationas Partof the Read v. Portec Factors
The court also stated that the case law includes the existence of a substantial
defense as one of the factors to be considered by the fact finders under the totality of
the circumstances test.147 Paramount to this consideration is whether a reasonable
person would agree that if litigated, the patent would be found invalid,
unenforceable, or not infringed. 148 Because the fact-finder is to "accord each factor
the weight warranted by its strength in the particular case," the court found this
approach better suited to apply to all of the circumstances in any given case than a
per se rule. 149 Therefore, the court expressly declined to adopt a per se rule. 150 This
may be considered as one aspect of the "[c]loseness of the case" factor under the
151
totality of the circumstances test announced in Read v. Porte.

1.

'An Affirmative Duty of Due Care"

Finally, the court noted that "there continues to be 'an affirmative duty of due
care to avoid infringement of the known patent rights of others."' 152 Yet, while there

is a continued affirmative duty of due care, the failure to produce an exculpatory
opinion of counsel at trial no longer allows the court to apply an adverse inference
153
which presumes that such an opinion, if obtained, was unfavorable.

145

Id. at 1347.

H6

Id.

147 Id.
H81Id.
149

Id.

150 Id.

151Read v. Portec, 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992).

KnorrBremse, 383 F.3d at 1345-46 (quoting L.A. Gear Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 988
F.2d 1117, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
152

153

Id. at 1346.
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VI. XECHEM. COINVENTORSHIP TO EXPLOIT INVENTION

The case of Xeehem International,Inc. v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson
Cancer Center is a controversial panel opinion; Xeehem is the latest chapter in the
saga of unnamed co-inventors being added or sought to be added to a patent in order
to gain the right to exploit the patent, notwithstanding the exclusive rights of the
patentee or an exclusive licensee. 154
Historically, every claim in a patent required an inventive contribution of every
inventor named on the patent. 155 Yet, under the current and more liberal statute
that was introduced twenty years ago, today a single person who has made an
156
inventive contribution to any claim may be added to the patent as a co-inventor.
Thus, "[i]nventors may apply for a patent jointly even though... each did not make a
157
contribution to the subject matter of every claim of the patent."

A. The Seemingly Late Filingof a Coinventorship Suit
To the extent that "claim 102" recites a trivial modification of a generic concept,
where "claim 102" was the co-invention of a minor research employee or collaborator
who was not named as an inventor and did not have an assignment obligation to the
patentee, adding the co-inventor of "claim 102" thus permits him to transfer the right
to make, use and sell all subject matter of all claims to a competitor of the
patentee. 158 It is a default rule unique to the United States that gives this right to
159
each co-inventor.
The American rule has led to litigation seeking to add an unnamed co-inventor
even many years after the patent has been granted. 160 If such a move were to be
successful, then that co-inventor may grant a license or transfer his right to
anyone. 161 This is true even though the patentee may have been relying upon its
exclusive rights under the patent or there may be an exclusive license to a third

151 See Xechem Int'l, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d 1324, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
155 Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1998)

(Newman, J., dissenting).
156 Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-622, sec. 1, tit. I., § 104(a), 98 Stat. 3384
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2000)).
157
158

35 U.S.C. § 116 (2000).
See id.; id. § 262.

159 -d. § 262.
In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, each of the joint owners of
a patent may make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented invention within the
United States, or import the patented invention into the United States, without
the consent of and without accountingto the other owners.
Id. (emphasis added).
160 See, e.g., Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, Inc., 119 F.3d 1551, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (involving
an appeal of a co-inventorship suit originally filed four years after the first of the several patents at
issue was granted).
161 See 35 U.S.C. § 262.

[4:1 2004]

John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

party under the patent. 162 Unless an exclusive license agreement is construed as an
"agreement to the contrary," the co-inventor's right trumps the exclusivity of the
"exclusive" licensee. 163

B. The Right to Seek Correction Years Later
In one case, the court permitted a suit to correct inventorship several years after
the omitted inventor knew or should have known of the possible error in the
inventorship nomination. 164 As a result, a lenient rule was announced for the
1 65
correction of inventorship in issued patents.

C State UniversityImmunity from FederalCourt Correction
Absent consent of all parties, the sole avenue for the correction of inventorship of
a patent is through a Federal Court action.1 66 Yet, as held in Xechem, where a state
university is the patentee, the patentee can defend a federal court action for the
correction of inventorship simply by pleading sovereign immunity. 167

D. State CourtResolution oflnventorship Changes in Patents
In a bizarre instance, while the panel in Xechem denied the right to correct
inventorship of a state-owned patent, it also provided obiter dictum which suggests
that a state court may provide a remedy.168 It has heretofore been crystal clear that

162
163

164

Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1465-66 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
See 35 U.S.C. § 262.
Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, Inc., 29 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The Federal Circuit

reversed a claim of late filing where
[t]he district court granted summary judgment to [the defendant] with respect to
correction of inventorship. The [district] court held that [the plaintiff] knew or
should have known of the existence of the ... patent when he received the Annual
Report in early 1989, and that he had not acted diligently in seeking the
correction. The summary judgment was applied to all six patents. The state law
tort claims were dismissed as barred by the three-year statute of limitations. The
contract and unfair trade practice claims were also dismissed, the court ruling
that [the plaintiff] had one year from the date of dismissal to bring these claims in
state court.
Id. at 1572.
105 Id. "[Title 35 U.S.C. §] 256 does not limit the time during which inventorship can be
corrected. Section 256 thus serves the public policy of preserving property rights from avoidable
forfeiture." Id. at 1573 (citation omitted).
166 Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
167Xechem Int'l, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d 1324, 1327-32 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (relying on Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627 (1999); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999)).
108

See id.at 1332.
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only a federal court can order correction of inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256.169
However, the court suggests that a state court may have jurisdiction to resolve the
inventorship dispute. 170 Yet, by statute, only a federal court may order correction of
171
an inventorship error.

VII.

FISHER: PATENT-ELIGIBILITY "USEFUL[NESS]"

The Exparte Fisherappeal that is expected to be argued and decided in 2005172
reopens a controversy dating back to the controversial 1967 split opinion of a
predecessor court in Kirk.17 3 The question presented in Kirk was: does patenteligibility reside in a chemical or biotechnology invention to a new entity where that
new entity has no established or purported specific utility?1 74 The Fisher case has

the potential of being either the single most important pharmaceutical patent case in
recent years-or a yawn-as the court is presented with the challenge of the review
of debates over patent-eligibility of pharmaceutically uncharacterized, new biological
17 5
and chemical entities.

A. The 1991 NlHAttempt to Patent Thousands of Express Sequence Tags (ESTs)
Thousands of mostly uncharacterized ESTs 176 were the subject of a single
controversial 1991 patent application filed by the National Institutes of Health

169See 35 U.S.C. § 256,
1 (2000). The USPTO, alone, is without authority to correct
inventorship where the State hides behind its sovereign immunity and refuses to join in a USPTO
correction action: "[T]he Director may, on application of all the parties and assignees .... issue a
certificate correcting [the inventorship] error." Id. (emphasis added).
170 Xechem, 382 F.3d at 1332.
17135 U.S.C. § 256, 2.
The error ...

shall not invalidate the patent ...

if it can be corrected as provided in

this section. The court before which such matter is called in question may order
correction of the patent on notice and hearing of all parties concerned and the Director
shall issue a certificate accordingly.
Id.
172 Exparte Fisher, No. 2002-2046 (U.S.P.T.O. Bd. Pat. App. & Interferences Mar. 31, 2004),
appeal docketed, No. 04-1465 (Fed. Cir. July 14, 2004), available at http://lorac.typepad.com/patentblog /files/fisher est sequences.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
17'
In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
17'Id.
175 Seo Fis-her, No. 2002-2046.

176See generally,Leora Ben-Ami et al., Biotech PatentLaw Developments, in BIOTECH PATENT
LAW DEVELOPMENTS 557-58 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course,
Handbook Series No. 573, 1999), available atWL, 573 PLI/Pat 555.
The [Human Genome Project or] HGP exploits the fact that in a given genome,
only a small percentage of the DNA present actually codes for proteins. Under
this approach random sequences of the coding DNA are "fished out" often without
any knowledge of what the DNA encodes. The DNA sequences produced by this
technique are referred to as expressed sequence tags or "ESTs."
Id. at 558.
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("NIH").177 It was pointed out by a biotechnology patent examiner that the NIH itself
had admitted that "a]bout 83% [of the claimed ESTs] are unrelated to any previously
known sequences, as determined by homology comparisons to nucleotide
databases."1 78
Patent eligibility of a naked EST, without more, was widely
questioned because it was widely thought that an EST, alone, did not have statutory
utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101.179
Three years later, Professors Eisenberg and Merges-two of the leading patent
academics of the day-published a famous opinion letter criticizing the patenting of
181
They also challenged the patent-eligibility of such ESTs.
ESTs.180
Contemporaneous with the NIH attempt to patent ESTs, Lorance Greenlee, a Ph.D.
scientist-lawyer, expressed doubt about any degree of predictability for EST utility
based upon the state of the art at that time.18 2 Greenlee's thoughts on the matter
supported the view of critics of the NIH patent application that it should be denied on
the basis that the subject matter did not meet the patent-eligibility test of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.183

B. The Emerging Face ofPredictableFunctionality
Stripping away the policy arguments of Professors Eisenberg and Merges to
focus solely on the issue of patent-eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the USPTO's
then-leading legal expert in biotechnology, Associate Solicitor Scott Chambers,

177

Stephen B. Maebius, Novel DNA Sequences and the Utility Requirement.*The Human

Genome Initiative, 74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 651, 651 n.2 (1992) (citing Geneticists and
Religious Leaders Ponder Implications of the Human Genome Project, GENETIC ENG'G NEWS, Apr.
15, 1992, at 29); see also BenAmi, supra note 176, at 557-58.
The leading case concerning utility, Brenner v. Manson, [383 U.S. 519 (1966),]
suggested that ESTs would not be patentable. In that case, the Supreme Court
held that a process useful solely as a step in further research failed to meet the
statutory requirement of being "useful" and a process or product with no known
use, or that is useful only in the sense that it may be the subject of scientific
research, is not patentable. Opponents of EST patents argued that ESTs, with no
known function or associated protein, had no use beyond being the subject of
scientific research.
-d.
at 558 (footnotes omitted).
17"Maebius, supra note 177, at 653. Mr. Maebius resigned from the USPTO in 1991, before he
authored the Journalof the Patentand TrademarkOffice Society article cited in note 177, supra.
179See Ben-Ami, supra note 176, at 558 ("Although ESTs may be useful as probes in locating
particular genes, they may not identify the function of the gene or any associatedprotein (emphasis
added)).
IS0Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter as to the Patentabilityof Certain
In ventions Associated with the IdentificationofPartialeDNA Sequences, 23 A.I.P.L.A. Q.J. 1 (1995).
1S Id. at 51-52.
182 Lorance L. Greenlee, Biotechnology PatentLaw: Perspective of the First Seventeen Years,
Prospective on the Next Seventeen Years, 68 DENV. U. L. REV. 127, 136 n.48 (1991) ("At present,
models of protein structure are not sufficiently developed to predict accurately three-dimensional
configurations of a given sequence. The functional properties of a given amino acid sequence are
almost never predictable from sequence alone.").
183 See id.
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foresaw a different picture.18 4 Mr. Chambers saw the day when ESTs would be able
to pass patent muster with sufficient utility, arguing nearly ten years ago that
[iif the patent applicant provide[s] precise chromosomal map locations for
each of the EST fragments, sufficient utility for 35 U.S.C. § 101 might be
present. Numerous scientific articles have stated that precise marker
locations are very important to the Human Genome Project ('HGP'). This
project represents a 3-5 billion dollar market. Any element that is
fundamental to a $3 billion market has utility. 185

Indeed, at the relatively primitive time in the evolution of the science in 1995,
Chambers noted that the use of EST markers as genetic probes does satisfy the
requirement of utility in 35 U.S.C. §101.186 Because the cytological locations of many
diseases are known, making a large number of probes available to researchers allows
them to quickly identify probes that "correlate closely with the disease locus,
speeding the development of diagnostic probes." 187 The result of this use of ESTs
188
creates a more efficient and easier method to create these diagnostic probes.
Chambers also points out that currently, researchers identify a disease by
looking at what parts of which chromosomes are similar in all individuals with that
disease.18 9 However, this practice does not provide sufficient information regarding
the location of a gene on a chromosome and is less precise than using ESTs because
the use of an EST can supply the exact location of corresponding DNA. 190

C. Sequenee Motifs and Computer Bioehemistry
It is now more than ten years since the NIH filings with naked utility
disclosures for the functionally of unidentified ESTs. Much has changed. Patentees
are now routinely defining their ESTs in terms of their "sequence motifs," the unique
amino acid patterns within genes that are seen to provide a specific biological
function. Where there are multiple sequence motifs present that can be linked to a
specific utility, an otherwise uncharacterized EST may very well have a highly
predictable utility. One expert, Lee Bendekgey, opined that traditional laboratory
research in the future will only be used to confirm the results of research performed
using computers and databases. 191 Bendekgey also noted that researchers can
18' See Scott A. Chambers, Comments on the Patentabilityof Certain Inventions Associated
with the Identification of PartialeDNA Sequences, 23 A.I.P.L.A. Q.J. 53, 55-56 (1995) (footnote
omitted).
185 Id.
186 Id. at 55-56.
187 Id. at 56.
188 Id.
189Id.
190

Id.

191 Lee Bendekgey,
Development:

The

Transition to E-Research in Pharmaceutical Research and

Public Policy Implications, in WORKSHOP REPORT ON MANAGING IPR IN A
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY - BIOINFORMATICS AND THE INFLUENCE OF PUBLIC POLICY, app. Al at
viii (European Comm'n Nov. 2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/era/pdf/iprbioinformatics-workshopreport.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2004).

[4:1 2004]

John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

currently identify genes using EST datasets and gene prediction software, and
further assign the proposed function of such genes through homology analysis, which
confirms the existence of "motifs" associated with classes of genes. 192 This expression
data can assist researchers in identifying what genes to "target" in the formulation of
a therapeutic drug or diagnostic tests. 193 Bendekgey proceeded to imagine a time
when "wet lab" experimentation is only needed to verify the results predicted via
194
electronic research.
Teresa Attwood discussed an electronic database, "PRINTS," that consists of
"protein fingerprints" that identify family relationships among recently discovered
gene sequences. 195 This was achieved by
exploit[ing] groups of conserved [sequence] motifs within sequence
alignments to build characteristic family signatures; an uncharacterised
sequence that matches all motifs can thus be readily assigned to a
particular family. The diagnostic power of fingerprints, and the extent of
documentation manually attached to each database entry, has lent PRINTS
a significant role in protein sequence analysis and, ultimately, genome
annotation.196

The use of sequence motifs in patents has now become a widespread practice,
with at least 1,500 references to a "sequence motif' having been used in United
States patents and patent applications published within the past year. 197 Also, there
are a vast amount of electronic databases that contain already determined gene
sequences and their purported functions.

D. Three Levels ofEST Utility

1. No Specific Utility (NIH)
As in both the cases of the NIH patent application and Fisher, there remain
some patent applicants who are seeking protection on naked ESTs with no
particularized utility statement. This is a classic Larson case 198 in biotechnology
192
193

Id.
See id.

Id.
195Teresa K. Attwood, Mobile, MetamolphosingAcademic Databases - CapturingIP on the

194

Move,

in

WORKSHOP

REPORT

ON

MANAGING

IPR

IN

A

KNOWLEDGE-BASED

ECONOMY

-

BIOINFORMATICS AND THE INFLUENCE OF PUBLIC POLICY, app. Al at iv (European Comm'n Nov.

2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/era/pdf/ipr-bioinformatics-workshopreport.pdf
(last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
196Id.

197 A search of the LEXIS database conducted on September 17, 2004 for all domestic patents
(and patent applications) for the past year having the term "sequence motif' yielded 1,513 hits, of
which twenty-nine used the terminology in at least one claim.
198 See Larson v. Crowther, 26 F.2d 780, 787 (8th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 648 (1928)
("An inventor is entitled to all the uses to which his invention may be put, even if he is not aware of
such uses when he secures his patent.").
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clothing and is hardly distinguishable from the bulk of the ESTs which were the
subject of the 1991 NIH application.

2. PropheticSpecific Utility (Sequence Motifs)
Yet, thanks to the collection of vast amounts of information and the creation of
databases with sequence motifs that fingerprint the functional identity of the new
ESTs, the state of the art has progressed geometrically to provide a much higher
degree of predictability as to specific utility. Thus, there have been more than 1,500
American patents199
and patent applications published in the past year that refer to a
"sequence motif."
To the extent that the state of the art has progressed to the
particular point that a specific utility can be fairly and reasonably predicted-as is
now the case with ESTs-then prophetic statements of utility are equally applicable
to ESTs as they are to classic organic molecules.
Thus, if there are several common sequence motifs in a particular DNA vis-a-vis
several known DNA sequences having a particular utility, there are varying degrees
of predictability that the new fragment will share the same utility. Computer banks
of information already have the existing knowledge in an electronic storeroom that
makes the determination of common utility a matter of simple calculation.

3. "Wet Lab" Confirmation of Utility
The third level of confirmation is through "wet lab" tests that will commence
only after there has been a clear conception of the invention. 200
One expert
"imagine[s] a time ... when the first actual 'wet lab' experimentation with a gene,
protein, antibody, or small molecule drug will occur when it is time to confirm the
20 1
predicted results using an assay or drug screen."

E. Case Law Evolution Since the 1967 Kirk Opinion

1. The 3-2 C. C.P.A. Holding in Kirk
Since the controversial split opinion in Kirk,20 2 there has been a disputed United
States policy that a new entity must have a disclosure of a specific utility to meet the
patent-eligibility
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101, which require the invention to be
"useful."20 3 In addition, a fortiori,absent such a disclosure, there is no explanation of

199See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
200 See Bendekgey, supra note 191.
201 I-d.
202In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
203Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 529 (1966); see also MPEP, supra note 123, § 2107.01.
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"how to ...
use" the invention
under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
20 4
entity is not patentable.

1, and therefore, the new

2. Modern Pronouncementsfrom the Court
The Kirk case was distinguished in Brana, in which the court noted the lack of
specificity of the teaching of utility as a basis for denial in Kirk.20 5 Under classic
principles of patent law, any statutory utility meets the requirement for patenteligibility. 20 6 "The threshold of [statutory] utility [under 35 U.S.C. § 101] is not high:
An invention is 'useful' under section 101 if it is capable of providing some
identifiable benefit." 207 As pointed out by Judge Clevenger:
[f]or over 200 years, the concept of utility has occupied a central role in our
patent system. Indeed, '[t]he basic quid pro quo contemplated by the
Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit
derived by the public from an invention with substantial utility.'
Consequently, it is well established that a patent may not be granted to an
invention unless substantial or practical utility for the invention has been
208
discovered and disclosed.
In the context of a reduction to practice, the court has emphasized that any activity
may establish patent-eligibility: "In the pharmaceutical arts, our court has long held
that practical utility may be shown by adequate evidence of any pharmacological
activity." 20 9 The court quoted with approval from the Campbell v. Wettstein case in
the context of establishing a reduction to practice: .'.[Under well-established
precedent, evidence establishing substantial utility for any purpose is sufficient to
show reduction to practice."' 210 Thus,
[s]uch activity constitutes a practical utility because "[it is inherently faster
and easier to combat illnesses and alleviate symptoms when the medical
profession is armed with an arsenal of chemicals having known
pharmacological activities. Since it is crucial to provide researchers with an
incentive to disclose pharmacological activities in as many compounds as

201 Soo 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 (2000).
20 5
In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In Kirk,the court found that
[t]he specification . . . failed to disclose which biological properties made the
compounds useful. Moreover, the court found that known specific uses of similar
compounds did not cure this defect since there was no disclosure in the
specification that the properties of the claimed compounds were the same as those
of the known similar compounds.

Id.
206 Soo, e.g., Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274, 275 (7th Cir. 1903) (stating that an invention meets
the utility requirement for patentability unless it "is incapable of serving any beneficial end").
207

Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

208

Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
Id. at 1564 (emphasis added).
Id. (quoting Campbell v. Wettstein, 476 F.2d 642, 646-47 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).

209
210
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possible, we conclude that adequate proof of any such activity constitutes a
' 2
showing of practical utility. 11

F. 'Bet the Company' The Fisher Test Case
The utility statement for modern EST patent applications is today often quite
complete insofar as the sequence motifs that are disclosed are the basis for a
reasonable prediction of a statutory utility that meets the Kirk standard. Yet, the
Fishercase is a throwback to the earliest EST applications.
If Fisbheris to be a frontal assault on the Kirk standard, it represents a difficult
test case vis-a-vis one with a better utility disclosure.

To the extent that the Fisher

case is affirmed, this could well translate into a much more difficult time for patent
applicants seeking any kind of EST patent.

VIII. THE POSSESSION REQUIREMENT FOR PRIORITY

A. The Necessity of a Common Standardof Disclosurefor Priority
Priority for an invention based upon an earlier application requires that the
same invention be disclosed in the earlier application in a manner sufficient to
212
permit the invention to be reproduced by an individual of ordinary skill in the art.
It is extremely important that there be a harmonious standard for what constitutes
the "same" invention for purposes of priority. This is because the bulk of patent
filings around the world claim priority based upon an earlier "home country" or other
first filing. 213 If that home country has a different standard, then this upsets the
international patent regime regardless of whether that standard is higher or lower.
If the standard for disclosure is higher in the home country, then, as a general
rule, the original filing will be delayed somewhat as the application will more likely
be filed when the disclosure requirements of the home country are met. While this
does not hurt the applicant in the later country from a standpoint of meeting the
disclosure requirements, if the priority date is deferred it may mean that an
2 14
intervening third party could obtain superior rights.
211Id.
212 35

(quoting Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980)).

U.S.C. § 120 (2000).

21:3 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting WhatAn EmpiricalExploration of
PatentProsecution,53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2119-20 (2000) (noting that approximately forty percent
of patents filed in the United States during the period the study was conducted claimed priority to
applications filed outside the United States).
211 Under the patent laws of most countries, if a third party files an application in any country
that discloses the same invention with a priority date under the Paris Convention before a first-toinvent but second-to-file competitor, then (absent derivation), the publication of the third party's
application constitutes a novelty-defeating absolute bar against the first-to-invent but second-to-file
competitor. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Sept. 5, 1970, art. 4., 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. The United States does not follow the
international rule on this point of law; instead, under the notorious Hilmerrule, it denies a patent-
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If the standard for disclosure is lower in the home country than in the United
States, then a perfectly proper United States application that is filed based upon a
perfectly proper foreign application disclosing the same invention may be denied
priority. This is precisely the problem that was dealt with thirty years ago in the
notorious case of Kawai v. Metlesics, where a Japanese applicant filed a United
States application fully meeting the statutory requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112,
1,
based upon a Japanese application fully meeting the statutory requirements of
Japanese law at the time. 215 However, priority was denied because the foreign
application did not meet the disclosure requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112.216 Kawai
sparked retribution in the Japanese courts, which denied priority in Japan for a
Japanese application fully meeting Japanese disclosure requirements where the
home country priority application met the home country's legal requirements but not
217
a unique Japanese requirement.

B. The Unique, American Parent 'Possession"Rule
As with all other countries, 218 the United States historically has had a
requirement that in order to enjoy filing priority, the same invention must be
disclosed in the original, priority application (and in a manner to permit a worker
skilled in the art to carry out the invention).219 But, exceptionally, renegade panels
of the Federal Circuit have imposed an additionalrequirement for priority: There
also must be "possession" of the full scope of the generic invention in the priority
application even if there is an identical disclosure of a generic invention in the
2 20
priorityapplication.
The en banc Federal Circuit has refused to consider this issue; most recently, the
court failed by a 7-5 vote to take the matter en banc in the notorious case of
University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co. 221 This domestic law and the merits of
222
the issues are considered exhaustively elsewhere.

defeating date as of the Paris Convention priority date. See In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859 (C.C.P.A.

1966).
2151
Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
216 Id. at 891.
217 T. Aoyama, The Hoechst Case - A New Kawa, 59 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 263 (1977); Lutz
Walter, Comment to the Hoechst Case, 8 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 566, 570 (1977).
218 Paris Convention, supra note 214, art. 4.H.
219 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000).
220 See Enzo Biochem., Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
221 Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004), rehgen bane denied,
375 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
222 See Stephen B. Maebius et al., 'Possession"Beyond StatutoryEnablement: The Remains of

the Day after Rochester, 2004 FOLEY & LARDNER IP ROUNDTABLE (Foley & Lardner, Osaka, Japan),
July 21, 2004, available at http://www.foley.com/files/tbl-s88EventMaterials/FileUpload587/106/
Rochester.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
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C American Violation of the ParisConvention
The American priority requirement keyed to Rochester "possession" goes beyond
the maximum requirement for priority that is stated in the Paris Convention:
"Priority [for] elements of the invention [requires] that the [priority] application
documents as a whole specifically disclose such elements." 223 Thus, provided an
invention is "specifically disclose[d]" in the parent priority application, this is the end
of the inquiry. The Rochester possession requirement goes beyond this treaty
requirement and creates the very disharmony amongst the patent laws that the
Paris Convention proscribes.

22:3Paris Convention, supra note 214, art. 4.H. ("Priority may not be refused on the ground that
certain elements of the invention for which priority is claimed do not appear among the claims
formulated in the application in the country of origin, provided that the application documents as a
whole specifically disclose such elements.").

